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Abstract
We study the expressive power of fragments of inclusion and independence logic defined by
restricting the number k of universal quantifiers in formulas. Assuming the so-called strict seman-
tics for these logics, we relate these fragments of inclusion and independence logic to sublogics
ESOf (k∀) of existential second-order logic, which in turn are known to capture the complexity
classes NTIMERAM(nk).
1 Introduction
In this article we study the expressive power of independence logic FO(⊥c) [11] and inclusion logic
FO(⊆) [5] under the so-called strict semantics. These logics are variants of dependence logic [16]
extending first-order logic by dependence atomic formulas
=(x1, . . . , xn) (1)
the meaning of which is that the value of xn is functionally determined by the values of x1, . . . , xn−1.
Independence logic replaces the dependence atoms by independence atoms ~y⊥~x~z, the intuitive meaning
of which is that, with respect to any fixed value of ~x, the variables ~y are independent of the variables ~z.
In inclusion logic dependence atoms are replaced by inclusion atoms ~x ⊆ ~y, meaning that all the values
of ~x appear also as values for ~y. We study the expressive power of the syntactic fragments FO(⊥c)(k∀)
and FO(⊆)(k∀) of these logics defined by restricting the number of universal quantifiers in formulas.
We show that, under the strict semantics, the fragments FO(⊥c)(k∀) give rise to an infinite expressivity
hierarchy, while it is known that under the so-called lax semantics FO(⊥c)(2∀) = FO(⊥c) [7]. For
inclusion logic a strict expressivity hierarchy follows from our result showing that
FO(⊆)(k∀) = NTIMERAM(n
k).
Since the introduction of dependence logic in 2007, the area of dependence logic, i.e., team se-
mantics, has evolved into a general framework for logics in which various notions of dependence and
independence can be formalized. Dependence logic is known to be equivalent in expressive power with
existential second-order logic (ESO) [16], but for most of the recent variants of dependence logic the
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correspondence to ESO does not hold. Furthermore, the expressive power of these variants is sensitive
to the choice between the two versions of the team semantics called the strict and the lax semantics.
We briefly mention some previous work on the complexity theoretic aspects of dependence logic and
its variants:
• The extension of dependence logic by so-called intuitionistic implication → (introduced in [1])
increases the expressive power of dependence logic to full second-order logic [17].
• The model checking problem of full dependence logic, and many of its variants, was recently
shown to be NEXPTIME-complete. Furthermore, for any variant of dependence logic whose
atoms are PTIME-computable, the corresponding model checking problem is contained in NEX-
PTIME [10].
• The non-classical interpretation of disjunction in dependence logic has the effect that the model
checking problem of φ1 and φ2, where
– φ1 is the formula =(x, y)∨ =(u, v), and
– φ2 is the formula =(x, y)∨ =(u, v)∨ =(u, v)
is already NL-complete and NP-complete, respectively [14].
• The Satisfiability problem for the two variable fragment of dependence logic was shown to be
NEXPTIME-complete in [15].
• Under the lax semantics inclusion logic is equivalent to Positive Greatest Fixed Point Logic
(GFP+) and captures PTIME over finite (ordered) structures [8]. On the other hand, under
the strict semantics, inclusion logic is equivalent to ESO and hence captures NP [7].
The starting point of this work are the results of [4] and [7] charting the expressive power of cer-
tain natural syntactic fragments of dependence logic and its variants defined using independence and
inclusion atoms (See Definition 11 for the exact definitions). For a set C of atoms, we denote by
FO(C)(k∀) the sentences of FO(C) in which at most k variables have been universally quantified, and
FO(=(. . .))(k-dep) denotes those dependence logic sentences in which dependence atoms of arity at
most k may appear (atoms of the form =(x1, . . . , xn) satisfying n ≤ k + 1). The following results
were shown in [4]:
1. FO(=(. . .))(k-dep) = ESOf (k-ary),
2. FO(=(. . .))(k∀) ≤ ESOf (k∀) ≤ FO(=(. . .))(2k∀),
where ESOf (k-ary) is the fragment of ESO in which the quantified functions and relations have arity
at most k, and ESOf (k∀) consists of ESO-sentences that are in Skolem Normal Form and contain at
most k universal first-order quantifiers. Note that 2 implies an infinite expressivity hierarchy for the
fragments FO(=(. . .))(k∀) by the fact that ESOf (k∀) = NTIMERAM(nk) [12].
Dependence logic formulas have the so-called downward closure property which renders the strict
and the lax semantics equivalent for dependence logic formulas. The formulas of inclusion logic and
independence logic do not have the downward closure property, and hence the two semantics have
to be treated separately. In [7], the focus was on fragments of these logics under the lax semantics.
Below the fragments FO(⊥c)(k-ind) and FO(⊆)(k-inc) are defined to contain only those sentences in
which independence atoms with at most k+ 1 different variables, and inclusion atoms ~a ⊆ ~b satisfying
|~a| = |~b| ≤ k, may appear.
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(i) FO(⊆)(k-inc) < ESOf (k-ary) = FO(⊥c)(k-ind),
(ii) FO(⊥)(2∀) = FO(⊥),
(iii) FO(⊥,⊆)(1∀) = FO(⊥,⊆),
where FO(⊥) is the sublogic of independence logic allowing only so-called pure independence atoms
~y⊥~z. It is known that FO(⊥) = FO(⊥c) [9]. In this article we consider the fragments FO(⊆)(k∀) and
FO(⊥c)(k∀) under the strict semantics. Our findings are comparable to the results of [4] (see 2), but
the method of proof is different:
1. FO(⊆)(k∀) = ESOf (k∀) = NTIMERAM(nk),
2. FO(⊥c)(k∀) ≤ ESOf ((k + 1)∀),
3. ESOf (k∀) ≤ FO(⊥c)(2k∀).
Our results imply an infinite (strict) expressivity hierarchy for the logics FO(⊥c)(k∀) (FO(⊆)(k∀)).
This article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review some basic properties and results
regarding dependence logic and its variants. In Section 3 we prove a normal form theorem for logics
defined using dependence, inclusion, and independence atoms. The main results of the paper are then
proved in Section 4.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Team Semantics
In this section we define the essentials of the team semantics of dependence logic. In this paper we
consider only formulas in negation normal form, and structures with at least two elements. The notion
of a team is made precise in the next definition.
Definition 2. Let M be a structure with domain M , and V a finite set of variables. Then
• A team X over M with domain Dom(X) = V is a finite set of assignments from V into M .
• For a tuple ~v = (v1, . . . , vn) of variables from V , we denote by X(~v) the n-ary relation {s(~v) :
s ∈ X} of M , where s(~v) := (s(v1), . . . , s(vn)).
• For a subset W of V , we denote by X ↾ W the team obtained by restricting all assignments of
X to W .
• The set of free variables of a formula φ is defined analogously as in first-order logic, and is
denoted by Fr(φ).
We are now ready to define the semantics of dependence logic. We will first define the strict team
semantics and then discuss the ways in which the lax semantics differs from it. We will first define
satisfaction for the connectives, quantifiers, and first-order atoms (i.e., first-order formulas). Below
M |=s α refers to satisfaction in first-order logic.
Definition 3 (Strict Semantics). Let M be a structure, X and team over M , and φ a formula such that
Fr(φ) ⊆ Dom(X). Then X satisfies φ in M, M |=X φ, if
lit: For a first-order literal α, M |=X α if and only if, for all s ∈ X , M |=s α.
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∨: M |=X ψ ∨ θ if and only if, there are Y and Z such that Y ∪ Z = X , Y ∩ Z = ∅, M |=Y ψ and
M |=Z θ.
∧: M |=X ψ ∧ θ if and only if, M |=X ψ and M |=X θ.
∃: M |=X ∃vψ if and only if, there exists a function F : X → M such that M |=X[F/v] ψ, where
X [F/v] = {s[F (s)/v] : s ∈ X}.
∀: M |=X ∀vψ if and only if, M |=X[M/v] ψ, where X [M/v] = {s[m/v] : s ∈ X,m ∈M}.
A sentence φ is said to be true in M (abbreviated M |= φ) if M |={∅} φ. Sentences φ and φ′ are said
be equivalent, written φ ≡ φ, if for all models M, M |= φ⇔M |= φ′.
In the lax semantics, the semantic rule for disjunction is modified by removing the requirement
Y ∩ Z = ∅, and the clause for the existential quantifier is replaced by
M |=X ∃vψ if and only if, there exists a function H : X → P(M)\{∅} such that M |=X[H/v] ψ,
where X [H/v] = {s[m/v] : s ∈ X,m ∈ H(s)}.
The meaning of first-order formulas is invariant under the choice between the two semantics. Further-
more, first-order formulas have the following strong Flatness property.
Theorem 4 (Flatness). Let M be a structure and X a team of M. Then for a first order formula φ the
following are equivalent:
1. M |=X φ,
2. For all s ∈ X , M |=s φ.
2.2 Dependencies in Team Semantics
For the purposes of this paper, the following atoms are considered:
Definition 5. • Let ~x be a tuple of variables and let y be another variable. Then =(~x, y) is a
dependence atom, with the semantic rule
M |=X=(~x, y) if and only if for all s, s′ ∈ X , if s(~x) = s′(~x), then s(y) = s′(y);
• Let ~x, ~y, and ~z be tuples of variables (not necessarily of the same length). Then ~y ⊥~x ~z is a
conditional independence atom, with the semantic rule
M |=X ~y ⊥~x ~z if and only if for all s, s′ ∈ X such that s(~x) = s′(~x), there exists a s′′ ∈ X
such that s′′(~x~y~z) = s(~x~y)s′(~z).
Furthermore, we will write ~x ⊥ ~y as a shorthand for ~x ⊥∅ ~y, and call it a pure independence
atom;
• Let ~x and ~y be two tuples of variables of the same length. Then ~x ⊆ ~y is an inclusion atom, with
the semantic rule
M |=X ~x ⊆ ~y if and only if X(~x) ⊆ X(~y);
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Given a collection C ⊆ {=(. . .),⊥c,⊆} of atoms, we will write FO(C) (omitting the set parenthesis
of C) for the logic obtained by adding them to the language of first-order logic. With this notation
dependence logic, independence logic and inclusion logic are denoted by FO(=(. . .)), FO(⊥c) and
FO(⊆), respectively. We will also write FO(⊥) for the fragment of independence logic containing
only pure independence atoms. It is worth noting that the interpretation of the atoms is the same in both
the strict and the lax semantics.
The following proposition formalizes the basic relationship between the two semantics:
Proposition 6. [5] If M |=X φ in the strict semantics, then M |=X φ in the lax semantics.
All formulas of the above-mentioned logics satisfy the following property (with respect to both
semantics):
Proposition 7 (Empty Team Property). For all formulas φ ∈ FO(=(. . .),⊥c,⊆) and all structuresM,
M |=∅ φ.
Furthermore, a fundamental property of all dependence logic formulas is Downward Closure:
Proposition 8 (Downwards Closure). For all dependence logic formulas φ and allM andX , ifM |=X
φ then M |=Y φ for all Y ⊆ X .
Downward closure is enough to render the two semantics equivalent:
Proposition 9. [5] For all dependence logic formulas φ, models M and teams X , M |=X φ holds
under the strict interpretation if and only if it holds under the lax interpretation.
The following useful and natural Locality property holds generally only with respect to the lax
semantics:
Proposition 10 (Locality). [5] Let φ be a formula of FO(=(. . .),⊥c,⊆) whose free variables Fr(φ)
are contained in V . Then, for all models M and teams X , M |=X φ if and only if M |=X↾V φ, under
the lax semantics.
The failure of locality with respect to the strict semantics makes, e.g., the transformation of formulas
into prenex normal form highly non-trivial (See Section 3).
2.3 Expressive power and complexity
We elaborate on some of the results and definitions mentioned in the introduction.
The expressive power of dependence logic coincides with that of existential second-order logic. In
fact the following result holds with respect to both the strict and the lax semantics:
ESO = FO(=(. . .),⊥c,⊆) = FO(=(. . .)) = FO(⊥).
On the other hand, the expressive power of inclusion logic is sensitive to the choice of the semantics:
FO(⊆) = ESO
under the strict semantics, and FO(⊆) = GFP+ (over finite structures FO(⊆) = LFP) with respect to
the lax semantics. In this article, we take a closer look at the expressive power of the fragments FO(⊆
)(k∀) and FO(⊥c)(k∀) under the strict semantics. As in [4], we relate these fragments of inclusion and
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independence logic to the fragments ESOf (k∀) of ESO. Recall that ESOf (k∀) contains the sentences
of ESO in Skolem Normal Form
∃f1 . . . ∃fn∀x1 . . . ∀xrψ,
where r ≤ k, and ψ is a quantifier-free formula. It was shown in [12] that
ESOf (k∀) = NTIMERAM(n
k),
where NTIMERAM(nk) denotes the family of classes of structures that can be recognized by a non-
deterministic RAM in time O(nk). By the result of [2],
NTIMERAM(n
k) < NTIMERAM(n
k+1)
hence relating our logics to these classes gives us a method to show the existence of expressivity hier-
archies.
We end this section by defining the syntactic fragments of logics relevant for this article.
Definition 11. Let C be a subset of {=(. . .),⊥c,⊥,⊆} and let k ∈ N. Then
1. FO(C)(k−dep) is the class of sentences of FO(C) in which dependence atoms of the form =
(~z, y), where ~z is of length at most k, may appear.
2. FO(C)(k−ind) is the class of sentences of FO(C) in which independence atoms of the form
~y⊥~x~z, where ~x~y~z has at most k + 1 distinct variables, may appear.
3. FO(C)(k−inc) is the class of sentences of FO(C) in which inclusion atoms of the form ~a ⊆ ~b,
where ~a and~b are of length at most k, may appear.
4. FO(C)(k∀) is the class of sentences of FO(C) in which every variable is quantified exactly once
and at most k universal quantifiers occur.
3 A prenex normal form theorem
In this section we fix C ⊆ {=(. . .),⊥c,⊆}, and present a prenex normal form translation for FO(C)
sentences. We will prove the following normal form theorem.
Theorem 12. Let φ ∈ FO(C)(k∀). Then there is a φ′ ∈ FO(= (. . .), C)(k∀) which is logically
equivalent to φ and of the form
∀x1 . . . ∀xm∃xm+1 . . .∃xm+n(χ ∧ θ)
where m ≤ k, χ is a conjunction of {=(. . .), C}-atoms and θ is a first-order formula.
As mentioned previously, Proposition 10 is the key property used in the prenex normal form trans-
lations of [7, 13], and it does not hold in general in the strict team semantics setting. To illustrate this,
let φ := w ⊆ x and ψ := u ⊆ v ∨ w ⊆ v, and consider a model M = {0, 1, 2} and a team X defined
as
u v w
s0 0 1 2
s1 1 0 1
s3 2 1 0
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First we note that since x does not appear free in ψ, ∀xφ ∧ ψ is logically equivalent to ∀x(φ ∧ ψ)
under the lax semantics [13]. However, this is not the case if we are dealing with the strict semantics.
Then M |=X ∀x(φ ∧ ψ) but M 6|=X ψ (and hence M 6|=X ∀x(φ ∧ ψ)), and the latter is due to the
strict disjunction. It also easy to construct an analogous example where ψ is an existentially quantified
formula in which x does not appear free, and ∀x(φ ∧ ψ) is not logically equivalent to ∀xφ ∧ ψ under
the strict semantics.
The following restricted version of Proposition 10 in Lemma 13 is however true for the strict se-
mantics. Lemma 14 states that we can rename variables in quantifier-free FO(C) formulas. The proofs
of these lemmas are straightforward inductions on the complexity of the formula, and are thus omitted.
Lemma 13. Let χ be a conjunction of C-atoms and θ a first-order formula. Then for all modelsM and
teams X and sets V with Fr(χ ∧ θ) ⊆ V ⊆ Dom(X),
M |=X χ ∧ θ ⇔M |=X↾V χ ∧ θ.
Lemma 14. Let φ ∈ FO(C) be quantifier-free formula, and let M be a model and X a team such that
Fr(φ) ⊆ Dom(X). Then for any x ∈ Dom(X) and y 6∈ Dom(X),
M |=X φ⇔M |=X′ φ
′
where φ′ is obtained from φ by replacing all occurrences of x by y and X ′ is obtained from X by
replacing each s ∈ X by s′ which agrees with s in Dom(X) \ {x} and maps y to s(x).
For the translation, we need the following three definitions. Definition 15 introduces a mapping
that, given a sentence φ and its subformula ψ, gives us the variables over which ψ (as a subformula of
φ) is evaluated. Definition 16 describes some variables of a C-atom as non-conditional. Definition 17
introduces an operation which relativizes each C-atom in a formula.
Definition 15. Let φ ∈ FO(C) be a sentence. For a subformula of φ, the mapping Vφ is defined
recursively as follows:
• Vφ(φ) = ∅,
• if ψ = ψ0 ∧ ψ1 or ψ = ψ0 ∨ ψ1, then Vφ(ψi) = Vφ(ψ), for i = 1, 2,
• if ψ = ∃xψ0 or ψ = ∀xψ0, then Vφ(ψ0) = Vφ(ψ) ∪ {x}.
Definition 16. For a C-atom α, we say that x is non-conditional in α if
• α is ~y ⊥~x ~z and x is listed in ~y~z,
• α is =(x1, . . . , xn) and x is xn,
• α is ~x ⊆ ~y and x is listed in ~x~y.
Note that a C-atom α is satisfied in X if each non-conditional variable in α has the same constant
value in X .
Definition 17. Let ~x be a sequence of variables and φ ∈ FO(C) a formula. Then we let rel~x(φ) be the
formula obtained from φ by substituting each C-atom as follows:
=(~u, v) 7→ =(~x~u, v),
~v ⊥~u ~w 7→ ~v ⊥~x~u ~w,
~u ⊆ ~v 7→ ~x~u ⊆ ~x~v.
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The following lemma relates rel~x to the announcement operator δ introduced by Galliani in [6].
Namely, it states that M |=X rel~x(α)⇔M |=X δ~xα.
Lemma 18. Let M be a model, X a team and α a C-atom. Then
M |=X rel~x(α)⇔ ∀~a ∈M |~x|(M |=X(~x=~a) α)
where X(~x = ~a) := {s ∈ X | s(~x) = ~a}.
Proof. Let M be a model, X a team and α a C-atom. Since M |=X=(~u, v) ⇔ M |=X v ⊥~u v, it
suffices to prove the claim for independence and inclusion atoms.
• Assume that α = ~v ⊥~u ~w when rel~x(α) = ~v ⊥~x~u ~w, and assume first that M |=X ~v ⊥~x~u ~w.
Let ~a ∈ M |~x|. If s, s′ ∈ X(~x = ~a) are such that s(~u) = s′(~u), then by the assumption we
find s′′ ∈ X which agrees with s in ~x~u~v and with s′ in ~w. Since s′′ ∈ X(~x = ~a), we obtain
M |=X(~x=~a) ~v ⊥~u ~w.
For the other direction, assume that for all ~a ∈M |~x|, M |=X(~x=~a) ~v ⊥~u ~w, and let s, s′ ∈ X be
such that s(~x~u) = s′(~x~u). By the assumption we find s′′ ∈ X(~x = s(~x)) which agrees with s in
~u~v and with s′ in ~w. Since s′′(~x) = s(~x), we obtain M |=X ~v ⊥~x~u ~w.
• Assume that α = ~u ⊆ ~v when rel~x(α) = ~x~u ⊆ ~x~v, and assume first that M |=X ~x~u ⊆ ~x~v. Let
~a ∈ M |~x|. If s ∈ X(~x = ~a), then by the assumption we find s′ ∈ X such that s(~x~u) = s′(~x~v).
Since then s′ ∈ X(~x = ~a), we obtain M |=X(~x=~a) ~u ⊆ ~v.
For the other direction, assume that for all ~a ∈M |~x|, M |=X(~x=~a) ~u ⊆ ~v, and let s ∈ X . By the
assumption we find s′ ∈ X(~x = s(~x)) such that s(~u) = s′(~v). Since s(~x) = s′(~x), it follows
that M |=X ~x~u ⊆ ~x~v which concludes the proof.
For Theorem 12, it now suffices to prove the following lemma. In the following proof we will write
X [F/x] for the team {s(a/x) | s ∈ X, a = F (s ↾ V )} if F is a function from X ↾ V into M . In
the case of existential quantification, it will be sometimes useful, and always sufficient, to look for a
witness F : X ↾ V →M , for some V ⊆ Dom(X).
Lemma 19. Let φ be a FO(C) sentence in which every variable is quantified exactly once. Then for
any subformula ψ of φ, there is a formula ψ′ ∈ FO(=(. . .), C) of the form
∀x1 . . . ∀xm∃xm+1 . . .∃xm+n(χ ∧ θ)
where
1. χ is a conjunction of {=(. . .), C}-atoms where all non-conditional variables are existentially
quantified, and θ is a quantifier-free first-order formula,
2. x1, . . . , xm are universally quantified in ψ and xm+1, . . . , xm+n are new or existentially quan-
tified in ψ,
3. for all models M and teams X with Dom(X) = Vφ(ψ),
M |=X ψ ⇔M |=X ψ
′.
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Proof. Let φ be a FO(C) sentence. We prove the claim by induction on the complexity of the subfor-
mula ψ of φ.
• If ψ is a first-order atomic or negated atomic formula, then we choose ψ′ := ψ. If ψ is a
dependency atom with non-conditional x1, . . . , xn, then we let
ψ′ := ∃x′1 . . . ∃x
′
n(ψ
′ ∧
∧
1≤i≤n
x′i = xi)
where ψ′ is obtained from ψ by replacing each occurence of xi by x′i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Items 1 and
2 of the claim are now satisfied, and item 3 follows immediately by Lemma 13.
• Assume that ψ = ∀xψ0. Then by the induction assumption, for ψ0 there is
ψ′0 = ∀x1 . . .∀xm∃xm+1 . . .∃xm+n(χ ∧ θ)
such that items 1-3 hold. We choose ψ′ := ∀xψ′0. Clearly items 1-2 hold. For item 3, we have
by the induction assumption that for all M and X with Dom(X) = Vφ(ψ),
M |=X ψ ⇔M |=X[M/x] ψ0 ⇔M |=X[M/x] ψ
′
0 ⇔M |=X ψ
′.
For the second equivalence note that Vφ(ψ0) = Dom(X [M/x]).
• Assume that ψ = ∃xψ0. Then by the induction assumption, for ψ0 there is
ψ′0 = ∀x1 . . .∀xm∃xm+1 . . .∃xm+n(χ ∧ θ)
such that items 1-3 hold. We define
ψ′ := ∀x1 . . . ∀xm∃x∃xm+1 . . .∃xm+n(=(~z, x) ∧ χ ∧ θ)
where ~z lists Vφ(ψ). Items 1 and 2 clearly hold, we show that item 3 holds. For this let M and X
be such that Dom(X) = Vφ(ψ). Analogously to the previous case M |=X ψ ⇔M |=X ∃xψ′0,
so it suffices to show that
M |=X ∃xψ
′
0 ⇔M |=X ψ
′.
Assume first that M |=X ∃xψ′0 when there is a function Fx : X →M such that
M |=X[Fx/x] ψ
′
0. (20)
Since no reuse of variables is allowed in φ, variables x, x1, . . . , xm+n are pairwise distinct and
not in Vφ(ψ) when existential quantification over them preserves the size of the team. Therefore,
and by (20), we find Fi : X [M/x1] . . . [M/xm] → M , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that M |=X′ χ ∧ θ,
for
X ′ := X [Fx/x][M/x1] . . . [M/xm][F1/xm+1] . . . [Fn/xm+n].
Also, since ~z lists Dom(X), we have M |=X′=(~z, x). Now M |=X ψ′ follows since X ′ is also
of the form
X [M/x1] . . . [M/xm][Fx/x][F1/xm+1] . . . [Fn/xm+n].
For the other direction, assume that M |=X ψ′ when we find Fx, Fi : X [M/x1] . . . [M/xm] →
M , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that M |=X′=(~z, x) ∧ χ ∧ θ where
X ′ := X [M/x1] . . . [M/xm][Fx/x][F1/xm+1] . . . [Fn/xm+n].
For M |=X ∃xψ′0, it suffices to note that since M |=X′=(~z, x) and ~z lists Dom(X), we can
define Fx already on X . This concludes the existential case.
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• Assume that ψ = ψ0 ∧ ψ1. Then by the induction assumption, for ψ0 and ψ1 there are
ψ′0 = ∀x1 . . . ∀xm∃xm+1 . . . ∃xm+n(χ0 ∧ θ0), (21)
ψ′1 = ∀y1 . . . ∀yk∃yk+1 . . . ∃yk+l(χ1 ∧ θ1), (22)
such that items 1-3 hold. We will construct a ψ′ for which the induction claim holds. First note
that, for i = 1, 2, Vφ(ψ) = Vφ(ψi), and hence by the induction assumption
M |=X ψi ⇔M |=X ψ
′
i (23)
for all M and X with Dom(X) = Vφ(ψ). First we assume by symmetry that k ≤ m. We then
let χ′1 and θ′1 be obtained from χ1 and θ1 by replacing each occurence of yi by xi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
By item 2 of the induction assumption and the fact that no reusing of variables is allowed, no
quantified variable of ψ0 or ψ1 is in Vφ(ψ), and ψ0 and ψ1 do not share any quantified variables.
Therefore by Lemma 14, for all M and X with Dom(X) = Vφ(ψ),
M |=X ψ
′
1 ⇔M |=X ∀x1 . . . ∀xk∃yk+1 . . .∃yk+l(χ
′
1 ∧ θ
′
1). (24)
We then let
ψ∗1 := ∀x1 . . . ∀xm∃yk+1 . . . ∃yk+l(χ
∗
1 ∧ θ
′
1) (25)
where
χ∗1 := χ
′
1 ∧
∧
1≤i≤l
=(x1, . . . , xk, yi). (26)
Note that in (25), m − k universal quantifiers are added, and thus new dependence atoms need
to be introduced. Also note that in (26), the non-conditional variables yi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ l, are
existentially quantified. Now, using Lemma 13 it is straightforward to check that for all M and
X with Dom(X) = Vφ(ψ),
M |=X ∀x1 . . .∀xk∃yk+1 . . . ∃yk+l(χ
′
1 ∧ θ
′
1)⇔M |=X ψ
∗
1 . (27)
We now let
ψ′ := ∀x1 . . .∀xm∃xm+1 . . . ∃xm+n∃yk+1 . . . ∃yk+l(χ0 ∧ χ
∗
1 ∧ θ0 ∧ θ
′
1).
By the induction assumption, x1, . . . , xm are universally quantified in ψ, and xm+1, . . . , xm+n
and yk+1, . . . , yk+l are new or existentially quantified in ψ. Hence by (23), (24) and (27) it
suffices to show that M |=X ψ′0 ∧ ψ∗1 ⇔ M |=X ψ′ for all M and X such that Dom(X) =
Vφ(ψ). So let M and X be of this form, and assume first that M |=X ψ′0 ∧ ψ∗1 . Then there are
functions Fi, Gj : X [M/x1] . . . [M/xm]→M , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ l, such that
M |=XF χ0 ∧ θ0
and
M |=XG χ
∗
1 ∧ θ
′
1
where
XF := X [M/x1] . . . [M/xm][F1/xm+1] . . . [Fn/xm+n]
and
XG := X [M/x1] . . . [M/xm][G1/yk+1] . . . [Gl/yk+l].
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By Lemma 13,
M |=XF,G χ0 ∧ χ
∗
1 ∧ θ0 ∧ θ
′
1
where
XF,G := X [M/x1] . . . [M/xm][F1/xm+1] . . . [Fn/xm+n][G1/yk+1] . . . [Gl/yk+l].
Therefore,M |=X ψ′. The other direction is analogous, so we conclude the conjunction case.
• Assume that ψ = ψ0 ∨ ψ1. Again, we will construct a ψ′ for which the induction claim holds.
Analogously to the conjunction case, we find ψ′0 and ψ∗1 of the form (21) and (25) and such that
for all M and X with Dom(X) = Vφ(ψ), M |=X ψ0 ⇔ M |=X ψ′0 and M |=X ψ1 ⇔
M |=X ψ
∗
1 . We then let
ψ′ := ∃a∃b∃c∀x1 . . . ∀xm∃xm+1 . . . ∃xm+n∃yk+1 . . . ∃yk+lξ (28)
where
ξ := =(b)∧ =(c) ∧ rela(χ0) ∧ rela(χ∗1) ∧ b 6= c ∧
(
(θ0 ∧ a = b) ∨ (θ
′
1 ∧ a = c)
)
. (29)
It suffices to show that for all M and X with Dom(X) = Vφ(ψ),
M |=X ψ
′
0 ∨ ψ
∗
1 ⇔M |=X ψ
′. (30)
For this note that, although ψ′ is not yet of the right form due to the improper alternation of quan-
tifiers, the existential quantifier block ∃a∃b∃c can be moved to the right-hand side of ∀x1 . . .∀xm
by proceeding analogously to the case of the existential quantifier.
For (30), let M and X be such that Dom(X) = Vφ(ψ), and assume first that M |=X ψ′0 ∨ ψ∗1 .
Then we find Y ∪Z = X , Y ∩Z = ∅, such that M |=Y ψ′0 andM |=Z ψ∗1 . Moreover, there are
functions Fi : Y [M/x1] . . . [M/xm] → M , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and Gj : Z[M/x1] . . . [M/xm] →
M , for 1 ≤ j ≤ l, such that
M |=YF χ0 ∧ θ0
and
M |=ZG χ
∗
1 ∧ θ
′
1
where
YF := Y [M/x1] . . . [M/xm][F1/xm+1] . . . [Fn/xm+n]
and
ZG := Z[M/x1] . . . [M/xm][G1/yk+1] . . . [Gl/yk+l].
By Lemma 13, we have
M |=Y ′ χ0 ∧ θ0 and M |=Z′ χ∗1 ∧ θ′1 (31)
where
Y ′ := Y [M/x1] . . . [M/xm][0/a][0/b][1/c][F1/xm+1] . . . [Fn/xm+n][0/yk+1] . . . [0/yk+l]
and
Z ′ := Z[M/x1] . . . [M/xm][1/a][0/b][1/c][0/xm+1] . . . [0/xm+n][G1/yk+1] . . . [Gl/yk+l],
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for some distinct constant functions 0 and 1. For M |=X ψ′, it now suffices to show that
M |=X′ ξ where X ′ := Y ′ ∪ Z ′. For the first-order part and dependence atoms =(b) and =(c),
we have by the construction that
M |=X′=(b)∧ =(c) ∧ b 6= c ∧ (θ0 ∧ a = b) ∨ (θ
′
1 ∧ a = c).
For the conjunction of relativized {=(. . .), C}-atoms rela(χ0) ∧ rela(χ∗1), first note that M |=Y ′
χ∗1 andM |=Z′ χ0 because all the non-conditional variables that appear in χ∗1 and χ0 are mapped
to 0 in Y ′ and Z ′, respectively. By this and (31), M |=Y ′ χ0 ∧ χ∗1 and M |=Z′ χ0 ∧ χ∗1. Since
X ′(a = 0) = Y ′, X ′(a = 1) = Z ′, and X ′(a = x) = ∅ for any other x ∈ M , we have by
Lemma 18 that M |=X′ rela(χ0)∧ rela(χ∗1). HenceM |=X ψ′ which concludes the only if-part
of (30).
For the other direction, assume that M |=X ψ′. We show that M |=X ψ′0 ∨ ψ∗1 where ψ′0 and
ψ∗1 are of the form (21) and (25). By the assumption there are functions Hd : X → M , for
d ∈ {a, b, c}, and Fi, Gj : X [M/x1] . . . [M/xm]→M , for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ l, such that
M |=X′=(b)∧ =(c) ∧ rela(χ0) ∧ rela(χ′1) ∧ b 6= c ∧
(
(θ0 ∧ a = b) ∨ (θ
′
1 ∧ a = c)
)
, (32)
for X ′ defined as
X [Ha/a][Hb/b][Hc/c][M/x1] . . . [M/xm][F1/xm+1] . . . [Fn/xm+n][G1/yk+1] . . . [Gl/yk+l].
First note that by (32), Hb and Hc are distinct constant functions, say 0 and 1, respectively. We
then let Y := {s ∈ X | Ha(s) = 0} and Z := {s ∈ X | Ha(s) = 1} when Y ∪ Z = X and
Y ∩ Z = ∅. It suffices to show that M |=Y ′ θ0 ∧ χ0 and M |=Z′ θ′1 ∧ χ′1 where
Y ′ := Y [M/x1] . . . [M/xm][F1/xm+1] . . . [Fn/xm+n]
and
Z ′ := Z[M/x1] . . . [M/xm][G1/yk+1] . . . [Gl/yk+l].
For M |=Y ′ θ0 ∧ χ0, since
Y ′ = X ′(a = 0) ↾ (Dom(X) ∪ {x1, . . . , xm+n})
and the variables a, b, c, yk+1, . . . , yk+l do not appear in θ0∧χ0, it suffices to show by Lemma 13
thatM |=X′(a=0) θ0∧χ0. For this, first note that by (32) and Theorem 4, for each s ∈ X ′(a = 0)
we have s(a) 6= s(c) when it follows that M |=s θ0. Hence by Theorem 4, M |=X′(a=0) θ0.
M |=X′(a=0) χ0 follows from (32) and Lemma 18. Therefore M |=X′(a=0) θ0 ∧ χ0 when
M |=Y ′ θ0 ∧χ0. Analogously we obtainM |=Z′ χ∗1 ∧ θ′1. This concludes the if-part of (30) and
thus the conjunction case and the proof.
4 FO(=(. . .),⊥c,⊆)(k∀) as a fragment of ESO
4.1 A translation into ESO
In this section we will show that FO(=(. . .),⊥c,⊆)(k∀) ≤ ESOf ((k + 1)∀). Moreover, it will be
shown that FO(=(. . .),⊆)(k∀) ≤ ESOf (k∀). For the first one, we need the following lemma.
12
Lemma 33. Let ~yv ⊥~x ~z be an independence atom. Then for all models M and teams X ,
M |=X ~yv ⊥~x ~z ⇔M |=X ~y ⊥~xv ~z ∧ v ⊥~x ~z (34)
Proof. The direction from left to right is straightforward. We prove the converse direction. For this,
assume that M |=X ~y ⊥~xv ~z ∧ v ⊥~x ~z, and let s, s′ ∈ X be such that s(~x) = s′(~x). Then by M |=X
v ⊥~x ~z there is s0 ∈ X such that s0(~xv~z) = s(~xv)s′(~z). Since s(~xv) = s0(~xv), by M |=X ~y ⊥~xv ~z
there is s1 ∈ X such that s1(~xv~y~z) = s(~xv~y)s0(~z) = s(~xv~y)s′(~z).
Interestingly, the right-to-left implication in (34) corresponds to the so-called Semi-Graphoid ax-
iom Contraction going back to [3] where it is listed as one of the elementary properties satisfied by
(statistical) conditional independence.
Proposition 35. For any sentenceψ ∈ FO(=(. . .),⊥c,⊆)(k∀) there is a sentence τψ ∈ ESOf ((k + 1)∀)
such that, for all A:
A |= ψ ⇔ A |= τψ.
Furthermore, for ψ ∈ FO(=(. . .),⊆)(k∀), it holds that τψ ∈ ESOf (k∀).
Proof. By Lemma 33 we may assume that each independence atom that appears in ψ is of the form
u ⊥~z w. We may also assume that ψ is in ∀∃-form:
∀x1 . . . ∀xk∃y1 . . . ∃ymχ, (36)
where χ is a quantifier-free formula. For inclusion logic sentences this normal form can be assumed
if χ is allowed to contain also dependence atoms. The idea is that a team X that arises by evalu-
ating the quantifier prefix of ψ can be represented by a k-ary relation S and functions fj encoding
the values the variables yj has in the team X . In particular, the variables yi will be translated by
terms fi(x1, . . . , xk). We will first show how to construct from the quantifier-free formula χ ∈ FO(=
(. . .),⊥c,⊆) a ESOf ((k + 1)∀) formula τχ such that for all models M and teams X ,
M |=X χ⇔ (M, S, ~f) |= τχ
where S and ~f encode X as above. The translation is defined as follows.
1. Let ψ be a first-order atomic or negated atomic formula α(~u). The formula τψ(S, ~f) is now
defined as
∀x1 . . . ∀xk(S(x1, . . . , xk)→ α(~w))
where ~w arises from ~u by replacing the variables yj by fj(x1, . . . , xk).
2. Let ψ be of the form =(z1, . . . , zm). The formula τψ(S, ~f) is now defined as
∃f∀x1 . . . ∀xk(S(x1, . . . , xk)→ zm = f(t1, ..., tm−1))
where ts = xj if zs = xj , and ts = fj(x1, . . . , xk) if zs = yj .
3. Let ψ be of the form ~z ⊆ ~w. The formula τψ(S, ~f) is now defined as
∀x1 . . . ∀xk∃xk+1 . . .∃x2k(S(x1, . . . , xk)→ (S(xk+1, . . . , x2k) ∧ ~t = ~s))
where ~t arises from ~z by replacing the variables yj by fj(x1, . . . , xk), and ~s arises from ~w by
replacing the variables xi by xk+i and yj by fj(xk+1 . . . , x2k).
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4. Let ψ be of the form z⊥~uw. The formula τψ(S, ~f) is now defined as
∃S1∃S2∀x1 . . . ∀xk∀x
′∃xk+1 . . . ∃x2k
(
S(x1, . . . , xk)→
(
S1(~uz) ∧ S2(~uw) ∧ (S2(~ux
′)→
(S(xk+1, ..., x2k) ∧ ~u1 = ~u2 ∧ z1 = z2 ∧ x
′ = w2)
))
where ~u1 and z1 are defined by replacing the variables yj by fj(x1, . . . , xk). In ~u2, w2 and z2
the variables xj are replaced by xk+j and the variables yj by fj(xk+1, . . . , x2k).
5. Let ψ be of the form χ ∨ θ. Now τψ(S, ~f) is defined as
∃S1∃S2
(
τχ(S1, ~f) ∧ τθ(S2, ~f) ∧ ∀x1 . . . ∀xk
(
S(x1, . . . , xk)→
[S1(x1, . . . , xk) ∨ S2(x1, . . . , xk) ∧ ¬(S1(x1, . . . , xk) ∧ S2(x1, . . . , xk))]
))
.
6. Let ψ be of the form χ ∧ θ. Now τψ(S, ~f) is defined as τχ(S, ~f) ∧ τθ(S, ~f).
We have given a compositional translation for a quantifier-free FO(=(. . .),⊥c,⊆)-formula χ. An easy
induction shows that this formula can be transformed to the form
∃f1 . . . ∃fm∀x1 . . .∀xk∀x
′θ,
where θ is a quantifier-free formula and where the functions fi may have arity greater than k. The
sentence ψ in (36) is now equivalent to a ESOf ((k + 1)∀) formula τψ of the form
∃S∃f1 . . . fm+n∀x1 . . . ∀xk∀x
′
(
S(x1, . . . , xk) ∧ θ
)
4.2 Capturing NTIMERAM(nk) with FO(⊥c,⊆)(k∀)
Let us first note that the following theorem follows immediately from ESOf (k∀) ≤ FO(=(. . .))(2k∀)
[4] and the fact that a dependence atom =(~x, y) can be expressed as the independence atom y ⊥~x y.
Theorem 37. ESOf (k∀) ≤ FO(⊥c)(2k∀).
Next we will consider inclusion logic.
Theorem 38. ESOf (k∀) ≤ FO(⊆)(k∀).
Proof. Assume that φ is a sentence of the form
∃f1 . . . ∃fn∀x1 . . .∀xkψ
where ψ is quantifier-free and first-order. Let 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Since ESOf (k∀) = ESOf (k∀, k-ary) [12],
we may assume that fi is of arity k. By the normal form given in Proposition 3.6. in [4], we may
assume that each occurrence of fi in ψ is of the form
• fi(x1, . . . , xk) or
• fi(fl1(~x), . . . , flk(~x)) where f, fl1 , . . . , flk are pairwise distinct existentially quantified funtion
symbols.
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Also by Proposition 3.6. we may assume that fi cannot appear both as an inner and an outer function
symbol even in different composed terms, and fi has at least one occurrence of the form fi(x1, . . . , xk)
in ψ. We will now translate φ to a sentence in FO(⊆)(k∀).
For 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let ci be the number of composed terms that appear in ψ and where fi is the
outermost function symbol. Then the occurences of fi in ψ are of the form
ti := fi(x1, . . . , xk),
and
uij := fi(tl1 , . . . , tlk), for j = 1, . . . , ci,
where, for 1 ≤ m ≤ k, 1 ≤ lm ≤ n and clm = 0. Note that the value of l1, . . . , lk depends also on the
value of i and j. This is not written down in the notation since the value of i and j will be always clear
from the context.
We now define φ∗ ∈ FO(⊆)(k∀) as
∀x1 . . . ∀xk∃(yi)1≤i≤n∃(zij) 1≤i≤n
1≤j≤ci
(
ψ∗ ∧
∧
1≤i≤n
1≤j≤ci
yl1 . . . ylkzij ⊆ x1 . . . xkyi
)
where ψ∗ is obtained from ψ by replacing each term ti (or uij) with variable yi (or zij). Let us
show that the equivalence holds.
Only-if part. Assume that M |= φ. Then there is M∗ := (M, fM∗1 , . . . , fM
∗
n ) such that
M∗ |= ∀x1 . . .∀xnψ.
Then by Theorem 4
M∗ |=X ψ
whereX := {∅}[M/x1] . . . [M/xk]. Let us extend each s ∈ X with yi 7→ tM
∗
i 〈s〉 and zij 7→ uM
∗
ij 〈s〉,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ ci. Let X ′ consist of these extended assignments. Clearly M |=X′ ψ∗. For
M |=X′
∧
1≤i≤n
1≤j≤ci
yl1 . . . ylkzij ⊆ x1 . . . xkyi,
let 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ ci and s ∈ X ′. We show that there is s′ ∈ X ′ such that
s(yl1 , . . . , ylk , zij) = s
′(x1, . . . , xk, yi).
We let s′ ∈ X ′ be such that
s(yl1 , . . . , ylk) = s
′(x1, . . . , xk).
Note that
s(yl1 , . . . , ylk) = (t
M∗
l1 〈s〉 , . . . , t
M∗
lk 〈s〉)
by the construction. Then
s(zij) = u
M∗
ij 〈s〉 = f
M∗
i (t
M∗
l1 〈s〉 , . . . , t
M∗
lk
〈s〉)
= fM
∗
i (s
′(x1), . . . , s
′(xk)) = t
M∗
i 〈s
′〉 = s′(yi)
which shows the claim and concludes the only-if part.
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If-part. Assume that M |= φ∗. Then there are functions Fi, Gij : {∅}[M/x1] . . . [M/xk] → M ,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ ci, such that M |=X ψ∗ where
X := {∅}[M/x1] . . . [M/xk][Fi/yi]1≤i≤n[Gij/zij] 1≤i≤n
2≤j≤ci
.
Let M∗ := (M, fM
∗
1 , . . . , f
M∗
n ) be such that, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and s ∈ X ,
fM
∗
i (s(x1), . . . , s(xk)) = s(yi). (39)
Because of strict semantics, fM∗ is well defined. We will show that
M∗ |= ∀x1 . . .∀xkψ.
For this, let s ∈ X when M |=s ψ∗. We will show that M∗ |=s′ ψ where s′ := s ↾ {x1, . . . , xk}. For
this, it suffices to show that
1. tM∗i 〈s′〉 = s(yi), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
2. uM∗ij 〈s′〉 = s(zij), for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ ci.
Item 1 is the definition stated in (39). For item 2, let 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ ci. Then uij is
fi(tl1 , . . . , tlk) and
uM
∗
ij 〈s
′〉 = fM
∗
i (t
M∗
l1 〈s
′〉 , . . . , tM
∗
lk 〈s
′〉) = s′′(yi), (40)
for a s′′ ∈ X such that
s′′(x1, . . . , xk) = (t
M∗
l1 〈s
′〉 , . . . , tM
∗
lk 〈s
′〉).
By item 1, we obtain that
(tM
∗
l1 〈s
′〉 , . . . , tM
∗
lk 〈s
′〉) = s(yl1 , . . . , ylk)
when
s′′(x1, . . . , xk) = s(yl1 , . . . , ylk).
By the assumption we know that
M |=X yl1 . . . ylkzij ⊆ x1 . . . xkyi. (41)
Since s′′ is the only possible witness for (41) with respect to s, we conclude that s′′(yi) = s(zij). From
this and (40) the equality in item 2 follows. This concludes the if-part and thus the proof.
By [2], ESOf (k∀) < ESOf ((k + 1)∀) follows for any vocabulary (see also Corollary 2.21 in [4]).
Hence, and by Theorems 35, 37 and 38, we obtain the following expressivity hierarchies.
Corollary 42. For any vocabulary, the following inequalities hold.
• FO(⊆)(k∀) ≤ ESOf (k∀) < ESOf ((k + 1)∀) ≤ FO(⊆)((k + 1)∀),
• FO(⊥c)(k∀) ≤ ESOf ((k + 1)∀) < ESOf ((k + 2)∀) ≤ FO(⊥c)((2k + 4)∀).
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5 Conclusion
In this article we have studied the expressive power of fragments of inclusion and independence logic
under the strict semantics. Our main result gives an exact characterization of the expressive power of the
fragmentsFO(⊆)(k∀). On the other hand, determining the exact relationship betweenFO(⊥c)(k∀)and
ESOf (k∀) remains an open problem.
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